Norming Guns Away: Social Norm Formation, International Influence, and the Second Amendment After Bruen

In the post-Bruen era, where historical tradition has been reaffirmed as the controlling interpretive framework, norm-based reasoning warrants heightened scrutiny.

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Opinion by Alan J. Chwick

Norming Guns Away: Social Norm Formation, International Influence, and the Second Amendment After Bruen iStock Palto 933906604

Contemporary debates over firearms regulation in the United States are typically framed in terms of public safety, empirical risk assessment, or constitutional doctrine. Less frequently analyzed, but increasingly consequential, is the role of Social Norm Formation in shaping both domestic firearms policy and judicial reasoning. The process commonly referred to as “Norming” is the gradual establishment of shared assumptions about what forms of civilian firearm possession are socially acceptable, legally permissible, or politically legitimate.

This piece is situated within the Supreme Court’s post-New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen framework, and argues that Norm-based reasoning, whether derived from international consensus, comparative law, or evolving policy preferences, stands in structural tension with a constitutional methodology grounded in text, history, and tradition. This tension is not merely theoretical, as it has direct implications for legislative drafting, judicial interpretation, and the durability of Second Amendment (2A) protections.

Norming as an Informal Regulatory Mechanism

Norms function as informal regulatory instruments. Unlike statutes or treaties, Norms operate through cultural reinforcement, professional consensus, and institutional repetition. Once embedded in society, they influence how problems are defined and which solutions appear legitimate. In firearms policy, Norming has increasingly framed civilian gun ownership as a deviation from a presumed baseline of state-managed security.

International discourse has explicitly embraced Norm Formation as a strategy for arms control.

Civilian possession of firearms is often grouped within broader categories such as in the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as “small arms and light weapons,” a classificatory move that minimizes legal and functional distinctions between lawful civilian arms, criminal misuse, and military equipment. Over time, this repetition of Norm Framing across multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations (a.k.a. NGO), and academic literature reinforces a presumption that civilian disarmament IS the regulatory default.

The ATT illustrates just how international instruments may function as Norm-Generating mechanisms, even where their formal legal scope is limited. Although the ATT governs international transfers of conventional weapons, its broader rhetorical and institutional influence extends well into our domestic policy debates. The ATT does influence international law.

In international law, widespread state practice accompanied by opinio juris (Latin for “opinion of law”) may crystallize into customary international law. While such Norms do not automatically override our constitutional provisions, they can exert extreme indirect pressure by reshaping the expectations about regulatory legitimacy. In the United States, this phenomenon raises recurring questions about the interaction between international soft law and our constitutionally enumerated rights.

As our broader gun-law scholarship has emphasized, the legal significance of these Norms lies less in direct enforceability than in their capacity to recalibrate the interpretive environment in which courts and policymakers operate.

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The Bruen Framework and the Rejection of Interest Balancing

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen marked a decisive rejection of the prior means-end scrutiny test in 2A cases, replacing interest balancing with a historical-tradition test rooted in the original public meaning of the constitutional text. Under this framework, contemporary policy consensus, domestic or international, cannot independently justify firearms restrictions absent to a well-established historical analogue.

Sadly, Norm-based arguments still remain prevalent in our legislative findings and lower-court reasoning. Claims that restrictions are justified because they align with modern standards, international practices, or evolving social expectations sit uneasily within Bruen’s methodology. The persistence of such arguments underscores the friction between Norming as a policy strategy and constitutional adjudication as presently conceived.

This piece complements my existing post-Bruen analysis in “The Founders’ Experiment: Arms in America” (Ammoland) by highlighting Norming as a parallel, extra-doctrinal force that may influence outcomes even where courts nominally adhere to historical analysis.

Social Stigmatization and Cultural Reinforcement

Norm Formation also operates at the social level. As civilian firearm ownership becomes increasingly stigmatized because of Norming, lawful gun owners may be portrayed as irresponsible or socially deviant. Such stigmatization narrows the range of acceptable discourse and discourages participation in public debate, thereby reinforcing the Norm itself.

The resulting participation gap, between the number of Americans who legally and lawfully own firearms, and those who actively engage in policy advocacy, has structural consequences. Norms tend to favor organized, professionalized actors over diffuse constituencies, amplifying certain perspectives while marginalizing others.

Understanding Norming is essential to properly evaluating the future trajectory of our 2A laws. Norms shape the background assumptions against which our constitutional rights are interpreted, defended, or constrained. In a legal system committed to written constitutionalism, unexamined reliance on evolving Norms’ risks can transform our enumerated rights into contingent privileges.

This does not require rejecting all regulation or denying the legitimacy of public safety concerns. Rather, it requires analytical clarity about the sources of authority invoked to justify regulations, and fidelity to the constitutional structures that govern those choices.

Constitutional Implications and the Risk to Enumerated Rights

Norming is neither accidental nor neutral. It is a deliberate process that shapes legal outcomes long before formal adjudication occurs. In the post-Bruen era, where historical tradition has been reaffirmed as the controlling interpretive framework, Norm-based reasoning warrants heightened scrutiny.

By situating Norm Formation alongside constitutional doctrine, it is important to reinforce a central theme of contemporary Second Amendment scholarship, making sure that the durability of our enumerated rights depends NOT only on judicial holdings, but also on sustained attention to the cultural, institutional, and international forces that seek to redefine its scope.

REFERENCES

U.S. Const. amend. II.

District of Columbia v. Heller, (2008)

McDonald v. City of Chicago, (2010)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, (2022)

Arms Trade Treaty art. 2, (2013)

Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, (1997)

Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, (2005)

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, (1997)

John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, (2000)

Saul Cornell, A Well-Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, (2004)

Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism, (2008)

Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, The Positive Second Amendment, (2018)

SEE ALSO:

So Called ‘Assault Weapons’ ~ When Words Are Used Instead of Guns To Disarm Us (Ammoland (04/19/2023))

Founders Knew: They Foresaw Today’s Unaccountable Government! (Ammoland (05/17/2023))

“Congress Shall Make No Law” vs. “Shall Not Be Infringed” (Ammoland (01/30/2025))

U.S. Second Amendment: Means ALL Weapons & ZERO Infringements (Ammoland (04/07/2025))

Are Gun Permit-to-Purchase Laws Unconstitutional? (Ammoland (04/24/2025))

When Paperwork Became the Policy: Firearms Regulation During the Biden Era (Ammoland (09/04/2025))

Your Moral Right To Keep & Bear Firearms In The United States (Ammoland (1121/2025))

The Necessity of Protecting Private Arms Possession in the United States: A Defense of Rights and Security (Ammoland (1229/2025))

The Founders’ Experiment: Arms in America (Ammoland (01/30/2026))

The Founders’ Experiment: Arms in America

Your Moral Right To Keep & Bear Firearms In The United States

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Alan J. Chwick, A.S., B.S., FL/NY/SC Paralegal is known for his in